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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Guy Taylor brought a malicious prosecution action
against the Borough of Midland, Pennsylvania and Midland police officers Richard
Winters and Robert Applegarth.  Taylor alleged that the defendants filed criminal charges
against him which were not supported by probable cause. 
The District Court determined that Taylor did not secure the favorable termination
of the criminal charges necessary to allow him to go forward with the malicious
prosecution claim, and thus granted summary judgment to the defendants.  Because we
conclude that the District Court’s determination is not supported by the record, we vacate
the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the grant of
summary judgment, and apply the same standard the District Court should have applied. 
Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F. 3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).  As Taylor was the
nonmoving party, we view the facts in the light most favorable to him and draw all
inferences in his favor.  Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir.
1992).  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
to be resolved at trial.  Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000).
3II.
On October 1, 2000, as Guy Taylor was walking from his car toward a
convenience store, a large dog owned by Robert Wilkinson lunged at Taylor.  The dog
was tethered and never reached Taylor.  Before driving away, Taylor threatened to kill the
dog–but not Wilkinson himself–if the dog ever bit him.  Wilkinson made a Voluntary
Statement of the incident to Officer Winters, including in it that Taylor had threatened to
kill both dog and master.  Winters dispatched his colleague, Officer Applegarth, to
investigate.
Applegarth soon spotted Taylor and signaled Taylor to stop his vehicle.  Upon
Applegarth’s request, Taylor produced his driver’s license, but not his vehicle
registration.  Winters soon arrived on the scene.  Taylor maintains that Winters was
extremely agitated, and that Winters cursed and shouted racial epithets at Taylor as
Winters hauled him from his vehicle.  Winters slammed Taylor onto the rear of the
vehicle, arrested him, and continued to pepper Taylor with racial slurs.  While in a
holding cell, Taylor could hear but not see Winters angrily demanding that an unnamed
person (presumably Wilkinson) include in a written statement that Taylor had threatened
to kill the unnamed person.
The officers contend that Wilkinson’s written statement was made before Taylor
was stopped and that it provided the probable cause to support the vehicle stop.  In this
version, Taylor was immediately belligerent, uncooperative, used foul language, and
    1  We note that Joyce’s affidavit was submitted on Taylor’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Because we find that the defendants
below, as the moving party, did not meet their initial burden of showing that their was no
genuine issue of material fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), we need not address the timing of
Joyce’s affidavit. 
    2  It is unclear whether any court action related to this case occurred on April 12, 2001. 
The record contains no court document from that date; nor does it contain any record of
the misdemeanors being dismissed.  Whether the April 12th date in the complaint was a
typographical error carelessly repeated by defense counsel and by Joyce, and whether any
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thrust his car door open, nearly striking Winters.  The officers deny that they ever used
racial epithets or that race was a motivating factor in their treatment of Taylor.
Taylor was charged with two misdemeanors: (1) under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(b),
making terroristic threats to Wilkinson; and (2) under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a), disorderly
conduct stemming from his roadside interaction with the officers.  Though he produced
his driver’s license but not his vehicle registration, and though neither the Police Criminal
Complaint nor the Information charged Taylor with the offense, on April 30, 2001, Taylor
pled guilty to the summary offense of failing to carry and exhibit his driver’s license on
demand.  For this offense, the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County sentenced
Taylor to pay $25 plus costs.  
  Taylor’s complaint avers, and the defendants’ answer admits, that the
misdemeanors were dismissed “on or about” April 12, 2001.  In his affidavit, Taylor’s
criminal lawyer, Richard P. Joyce,1 states that the “criminal charges were dismissed by an
Order of Court dated April 12, 2001,” and that at that time Taylor pled guilty to the
summary offense.2
documentation exists of the disposition of the misdemeanors, are two of the several
factual questions to be addressed on remand.  Adding to the uncertainty, defense counsel
asserted during oral argument that the admission to the April 12th date was in error.
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Taylor and the defendants agree that the criminal proceedings concerning the
events of October 1, 2000, have concluded, but the record is silent regarding the
particular disposition of the misdemeanors.  That is, it is unclear from the record whether
Taylor’s guilty plea to the summary offense was exchanged as part of a plea bargain for
dismissing the more serious charges, or whether Taylor’s guilty plea was separate and
apart from the decision to terminate the prosecution of the two misdemeanors.  
The defendants claim, without record evidence, that “[i]n response to [the
misdemeanor charges], Mr. Taylor agreed to plead guilty to the summary offense of
carrying and exhibiting a driver’s license on demand, ending the criminal proceedings
unfavorably for Mr. Guy Taylor.”  Conversely, Taylor’s criminal trial lawyer avers by
affidavit that Taylor refused various plea bargain offers, that Taylor’s plea of guilty to the
summary offense was not part of a plea bargain, and that the “commonwealth made an
independent determination to not continue with the prosecution of Mr. Taylor for
Terroristic Threats and Disorderly Conduct.”  
III.
Taylor, who is African-American, instituted this malicious prosecution action on
April 8, 2003, contending that the criminal charges were filed on account of Taylor’s race
and/or in retaliation for protected speech made by him, in violation of his constitutional
6rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  The District Court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, noting that it was undisputed that Taylor
pled guilty to the summary offense of failing to carry and exhibit a driver’s license on
demand, and so “[t]herefore, the case did not end favorably for plaintiff and he cannot
establish a claim for malicious prosecution.”  Dist. Op. at 3.  Tellingly, the District Court
wrote, “The record is unclear as to the disposition of the disorderly conduct and resisting
arrest charges.  We assume they were dropped as part of a plea agreement.  But it does
not change the analysis.”  Id. n.1.  
Contrary to the District Court’s statement, however, whether the misdemeanor
charges against Taylor were part of a plea agreement does change the analysis. 
To prove a malicious prosecution action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff’s
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without
probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing
the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a
legal proceeding.  
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
 Under Pennsylvania law, and according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
659 (1976), which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted in this context, criminal
proceedings are terminated in favor of the accused by
7(a) a discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary
hearing; or
(b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict; or
(c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the 
public prosecutor; or
(d) the quashing of an indictment or information; or
(e) an acquittal; or
(f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or 
appellate court.
Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d
519, 521 (Pa. 1993).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Haefner noted that “if the defendant is
discharged after abandonment of the charges by the prosecutor, this is sufficient to satisfy
the requisite element of prior favorable termination of the criminal action.”  626 A.2d at
521.  However, if the prosecutor drops the charges as part of a compromise with the
accused, the accused will fail the favorable termination prong necessary to maintain a
malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.  Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 580 (“Indeed, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has previously held that a prosecutor’s decision to withdraw
criminal charges pursuant to a compromise with the accused is not considered to be a
termination sufficiently favorable to support a malicious prosecution claim.”) (citing
Alianell v. Hoffman, 176 A. 207 (1935)).  Alianell’s simple rule has withstood the test of
time.  
We realize that as a practical matter, documentary evidence to establish the nature
of the termination of Taylor’s prosecution–whether by compromise agreement or by
8unilateral abandonment by the prosecutor–may be lacking.  Plea agreements are not
always reduced to writing and court reporters are not always available to transcribe what
on their surface appear to be routine adjudications.  Further complicating the inquiry, the
event in question occurred over three years ago, and memories of it may have faded.  Be
that as it may, on the record before us, we cannot conclude that no genuine issue of
material fact exists which would warrant granting summary judgment.
For the forgoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and
remand this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
